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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ALICE KESLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 15520

vs.
DAVID o. KESLER, Trustee
of the Estate of Alice
Kesler; DAVID o. KESLER,
an individual, and HELEN
KESLER, his wife,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
In this matter David Kesler, Defendant-Respondent,
son of Alice Kesler, Plaintiff-Appellant, seeks a judgment
from the above-entitled Court sustaining the trial court's
holding that a document marked Exhibit No. P-3, entitled
"Warranty Deed," is a valid gift to Respondent from
Appellant and should not be declared invalid.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court held for Defendant-Respondent
on all points.
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-2RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 14, 1971, the Appellant, Alice Kesler,
widow of Otto Kesler, executed an instrument creating a
revocable inter vivos trust of certain property to benefit herself and members of her family and by quit claim
deed conveyed the trust realty to her son, David O.
----------------------------------- - - - - - -

-- -

Kesler, as trustee. The trust res consisted of real
·"------and personal property located in Beaver and Millard

--------- ----

,---------------- -- -~ -~- -

___,_.

~

,._ .

--

Counties, including four (4) parcels of realty situated:'

~

-=---=~--

in the F_Ul!llore City Survey. f l t did not include 640

~-acre~ ~~-n-v~ed_b:,_ Re;;~~ts
~question.

1

in the Warranty Deed in

J

/On____Septelt\}:)~___lO,

1971, at the request of Mrs.
-J

Alice Kesler, Eldon Eliason, Esq., drafted a Statement
of Withdrawal pursuant to the provisions of the revocable
trust whereby Mrs. Kesler requested that the four (4)
,, - ~- ----------------~----------------
Fillmore parcels 1 be-withdrawn
from her trusJ:) Mrs.
r

-----------------------~----~

Kesler signed the Statement of Withdrawal, which was duly

1
contrary to the assertion in Appellant's brief,
the Statement of Withdrawal did not include the 640 acres
in question in this action.
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i)

c--;,----

notarized by Mr. Eliason in his Delta office.

In accord dJ'--"~-1._k;__ <

with the settler's request, the trustee, David

o.

''

Kesler,

t

-1

>!L,

-rt-£>_ ~0iJ(-

the same day by quit claim deed reconveyed the four (4)
------ - - - - ------------------------parcels to his mother.
-

~

-

-

-

---------------

-

---------------

On October 5, 1971, Mrs. Kesler wrote her son,

David, who by then had returned to his home in Montana.
She expressed her desire that "all my Fillmore property
(be) taken out of my trust," apparently not recalling her ( )
I

previous formal request to that effect.
she again wrote her son:

One week later

\

)

"Dave, was I to write to

Eliason and ask for my Fillmore property to be released
from that trust or did you see to that when you were
here."
On

J~~n

an instrument acknowledged

by the Millard County Clerk, Mrs. Kesler amended and modified her trust with regard to distribution of the trust
property upon her death.

Also that same day, Mrs. Kesler

requested the recordation of the September 20, 1971, deed
~self

from David as her

trus~

On July 14, 1972,

Mrs. Kesler executed a Last Will and Testament which was
attested to by Dr. Dean C. Evans and Scott A. Speakman,
both Fillmore residents.

'

,,!' , L,/

{} i-

David O. Kesler was named as
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,

(/Vl'~

/}t~

~

-4executor and residuary legatee of the Will and remained the
residuary distributee of the amended trust.

In both her

Will and the trust amendments, Mrs. Kesler limited the
possible devise to two other sons, Joseph F. Kesler and
Calvin T. Kesler, to $100.00 each under each distribution
as she was then involved· in a dispute with these two sons
over possession of certain other realty located near Cove
Fort, Utah.

In August of 1972, this dispute between Mrs.

Kesler and her sons, Joe and Calvin, was brought to this
Court for resolution in an action filed by Mrs. Kesler and
David in his capacity as trustee.
In February or early March of 1973, Mrs. Kesler,
desiring that Joe and Calvin be unable to "get their hands
on her property" and that David be compensated for helping
and sustaining her, requested that her counsel, Mr. Eliason,
draft a warranty deed conveying to David part of her
interest in the Fillmore parcels and an additional section
of realty west of Cove Fort.

Mr. Eliason, seeing a potential

conflict of interest, declined Mrs. Kesler's request and
advised her to secure independent legal advice.
recommend any particular attorney.

He did not

On March 9, 1973, David,

at his mother's request, drove Mrs. Kesler to Salt Lake City
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-5to the office of Mr. Fred Finlinson, Sr., Esq.

Mrs. Kesler

had previously become acquainted with Mr. Finlinson when he
was present at an accounting made by Mr. Ellsworth Brunson
in her action against Joe and Calvin.
Mrs. Kesler asked Mr. Finlinson to draft a deed
conveying the property in question to herself and David as
joint tenants.

2

Finlinson thoroughly explained to her the

effect of joint tenancies and then drafted the requested
warranty deed, which Mrs. Kesler signed and Mr. Finlinson
notarized.

David recorded the deed three (3) days later.

This property included no trust property whatsoever.

Six

hundred and forty acres had never been in the trust res and the
remainder,

the Fillmore property, had been withdrawn from

the trust res a year and a half previously.
At the taking of his deposition and at trial,
David testified that his mother had intended to convey
~

to him an undivided present interest in the property as

-----------------------

I..

a gift for several reasons .
. .--..--.........__

-

These reasons, among others,

were (1) for assistance in the lawsuit against Joe and
Calvin,

(2) to prevent Joe or Calvin from obtaining the

2 Mr. Finlinson testified at trial that Mrs. Kesler
originally only wanted a deed from herself to David but that
it was on his advice that the instrument was made in joint
tenancy.
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-6property, and (3) out of natural love and affection of
a mother for her son, especially since David and his
wife, Helen, had not "had things as easy" as Mrs. Kesler's
other descendants.

3

In addition, David testified that he

immediately recorded the deed in question at his mother's
specific request because "(s)he was worried that something would happen".

He also testified that his mother

was familiar with the operation of joint tenancies and that
this form of property ownership was chosen so that David
would be sole owner at Mrs. Kesler's death, and that both
the Fillmore property and the other 640 acres were discussed between them and mutually intended by them to be
the gift.

David further testified that he had no desire

to challenge his mother's present possession of and income
from the properties in question; rather, his testimony
was to the effect that he was in this action merely
defending his right of survivorship in the properties.
At trial, Mr. Finlinson testified that he had
advised Mrs. Kesler with respect to joint tenancies and
3 rn a letter to "Dave, Helen and baby" dated
October 12, 1973, Mrs. Kesler wrote:
"We went to all that
expense of building the museum (at Cove Fort) and Mary and
LeGrande and the boys and their wives got the whole benefit.
Never have you had a break with the others but earned it the
hard way. Helen too as your father and I did."
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-7that he had notarized the deed in question which Mrs. Kesler
executed in his presence.

Mr. Eliason testified that he

prepared the Statement of Withdrawal from the trust and
the September 20, 1971, quit claim deed in accordance with
Mrs. Kesler's instructions and that the documents were
executed before him at his office in Delta.
On the other hand, Mrs. Kesler testified, at
the taking of her deposition and at trial, that she had
never been in Mr. Eliason's office, that she had signed
nothing in Mr. Finlinson's office, that she was familiar
with the operation of joint tenancies, that she intended
that David have her Fillmore property at her death, and
that she regarded her memory as good.

She also testified

that she signed what she thought was a Will which was to
be recorded only at her death.

4

The trial court held for David Kesler on all
points,

including the character of the instrument (a

warranty deed in joint tenancy) and that it had been
validly executed and delivered as a gift to David.
4 Evidently, Mrs. Kesler was familiar with the
highly questionable Utah practice of a "deadman's deed",
whereby a granter delivers a deed to the grantee but
requests that it not be recorded until the grantor's
death.
As a method of avoiding probate and inheritance
taxes, such a practice is clearly against public policy
and should not be encouraged.
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ARGUMENT
It is elementary that a case on appeal to the
Supreme Court is decided on issues of law.

The trial

court, in the present case, after considering all the
evidence presented, has determined the facts, applied the
applicable law, and has clearly held on every point for
Respondent.
Appellant has failed to carry her burden in
proving the points below in the trial court.

On appeal,

Appellant has several additional burdens to overcome.
First, she must establish that the District Court erred
in its characterization of the instrument in question
as a deed and not as a will, even though the trial court
found the deed to be a valid warranty deed, clearly labeled
as such, signed as such by Appellant, and correctly
delivered to and recorded by Respondent.
Appellan~,

In addition,

in Point II through VIII of her Appellant

brief, merely repeats the same line of muddled inference,
clearly distinguishable case support,

misplaced burdens,

and attempts at emotional manipulation which it placed
before the trial court.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ESTABLISHED
THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT FAILED TO
CARRY THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN ATTACKING
THE JOINT TENANCY DEED IN QUESTION AS
A WILL AND NOT A DEED.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-9It is well-established law, in Utah and elsewhere, that a joint tenancy deed is to be taken at face value,
and not otherwise, unless contested by another party, who
then has a heavy burden of proof to show that the deed does
not mean what it says it means:
[It is a] universally accepted principle that joint tenancy documents, be they
bonds, bank or savings accounts, deeds,
negotiable instruments or the like, mean
what they say, and are invulnerable to
any other meaning until attacked by
someone. The latter (the attacking
party) . . . carries the burden of
proving otherwise. Such proof must be
by clear and convincing evidence. Spader
v. Newbold, 29 Utah 2d 433.
See also Hardy v. Hendrickson, 27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d
28 (1972); Beehive State Bank v. Rosquist, 21 Utah 2d 17,
439 P. 2d 468

(1968).

Appellants not only failed to prove that the
warranty deed was not a deed, but also failed to prove
that the warranty deed was a will which failed.

The intent

of Appellant in executing the deed to Respondent has been
clearly established by the trier of fact as being to execute
and deliver a warranty deed.
Appellant maintains that the intent of grantor

I

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10was not to pass a present interest, but rather an interest,
which somehow vested after grantor's death.

Appellant

failed to point out, however, that
[t]he controlling intent is that which is
expressed in the instrument, rather than
any belief or secret intention of the
party or parties which may have existed
at the time of execution.
It has been
pointed out, however, that the rule and
the intention of the maker governs in
determining the nature of such instruments
is to be invoked only when the recitals
of the instrument are obscure, equivocal
and uncertain.
23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds §177,
at 222-23 (1965) (Emphasis ad~
See also Thom v. Thom, 171 Kan. 651, 237 P.2d 250 (1951)
(in construction of deeds the intention of granter as
gathered from an examination of the instrument in its
entirety is controlling").

Appellant's reliance on

First Security Bank v. Burgi, 122 Utah 445, 251 P.2d
297

(1952), is misplaced here.

The issue in Burgi was

whether the deed had been effectively delivered to the
grantee.

Evidence in Burgi was conflicting since the

deed remained in grantor's valut until his death, so
evidence re intent was considered.

In the present case

there is no question of delivery of the deed physically
to grantee.

And even where the instrument on its face
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is equivocal--certainly not the case at bar--the fraud
of modern decisions has been to uphold the instrument as
a deed and not as a testamentary instrument.
The deed here is not obscure, equivocal, or
uncertain as to the time of its operative effect.

It

clearly states "WARRANTY DEED" on the top, and was signed
as such, before witnesses, by Appellant.
The only other possible explanation of Respondent's
intent was that she executed and delivered a so-called
"deadman's deed."

A "deadman's deed" is a deed delivered

to grantee by grantor, with the request that grantee not
record the deed until grantor's death.

Such "deeds" are

a method of avoiding inheritance taxes and probate, and
are clearly against public policy in Utah.

The trial court

wisely and correctly rejected the possibility that
Appellant's deed to Respondent was a "deadman's deed."
The court chose to judge the deed for what it is and should
be--an instrument conveying as a gift a present interest
in real property to Respondent.
Property ownership in joint tenancy is a legitimate will substitute and generally an effective probateavoidance device.

Appellant's actions and expressed
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-12desires are totally consistent with joint tenancy ownership.

As the joint owner

in possession, it is only

natural that she would collect income from the property,
pay the taxes, and generally manage the property.
Appellant as possessory co-owner,

in deed, may even be

liable to Respondent had she failed to pay taxes or
preserve the property.
Furthermore, joint tenancy ownership is consistent with Appellant's proven wish that the Respondent
have the property at her (Appellant's) death.

In the

event Appellant predeceased Respondent, then by operation
of law Respondent becomes sole owner of the property in
fee simple.
Finally, it is clear that had Appellant intended
this document to be a will she knew how to execute one.
She had executed a will in July, 1972, in which the formalities were met and in which she provided for her testamentary
disposition of property.
In short, it is clear that the deed in question
is a warranty deed, as the trial court found.

A warranty

deed is not a will, and it is not a "deadman's deed."

It is

exactly what the four corners and surrounding evidence as
proved say it is--a presently operative deed in joint
tenancy.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURTCORRECI'LY DETERMINED THAT
THE JOINT TENANCY WARRANTY DEED WAS NOT
INVALID FOR ALLEGED INEFFECTIVE DELIVERY.
The general rule, cited by Appellant, is that
"a deed does not become effective until it is delivered."
Gilbert v. Mcspadden, 91 S.W.2d 889, 899-90 (Tex. Civ. App.
1936).

Exactly what constitutes an effective delivery varies

according to the fact situation.

Certainly intent of the

granter to deliver a present interest of real property to
the grantee is a required element.

Appellant's confusion

in the case at hand centers around that nebulous and evasive
area of "what really was the grantor's intent."

As established

in Point I, supra, Appellant failed to meet the burden of
proof requirements establishing that Appellant's intent
was something other than that clearly evident from the
"four corners" of the warranty deed in question.
The warranty deed instrument was clearly signed by
the granter, and was in the possession of the Respondent.
The presumption can only be, in this case, that the granter
tendered possession of the deed to grantee with intent of
vesting in the grantee title to the property described in
the deed:
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-14(a) presumption of delivery of a deed
arises from its possession by the grantee
or one claiming under him.
In other words,
possession of a deed of property by the
grantee therein named . . . is prima
facie evidence of its delivery, and of
the grantor's intent then to vest
in the grantee title to the property
therein described.
23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds
§llS, at 163-64 (1965).
Presumption of a validly delivered deed is also
raised upon recordation of the deed:
It is generally held by nearly all the
authorities on the subject that the recording
of a regularly executed and acknowleged deed
by either the granter or the grantee raises
a rebuttable or disputable presumption
of delivery.
In other words, a prima facie
case is made by such showing.
Id. §120,
at 168-69.
This heavy burden on the Appellant-granter is
well-established in Utah:
A deed duly executed and acknowleged and
shown to be in the possession of the
grantee is self-proving both as to
execution and delivery, and that the
recording of a deed is likewise evidence
of delivery . . . And not only is the
burden of proving nondelivery upon the
plaintiffs, but the inference of delivery
arising from possession of the deed by
the grantee and from the recording thereof
is entitled to great and controlling
weight and can only be overcome by clear
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-15and convincing evidence. Chamberlain v.
Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 434, 436, 29 P.2d
355, 361, 362 (1934).
Later Utah cases are equally clear.

See Controlled

Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413 P.2d 807
(1966)

(deed from father through stawman to himself and

four children as joint tenants upheld); Allen v. Allen, 115
Utah 303, 204 P.2d 458 (1949).
In the present case, Appellant conceded even at the
trail court, that physical custody of the deed passed from
the grantor to grantee, that the grantee retained irrevocable possession of the deed, and that the deed was properly
recorded.

The inference of delivery was rightfully entitled

to great weight at trial court.

The trial court correctly

found that Appellant failed to overcome this inference by
"clear and convincing evidence."

Appellant also failed to

prove nondelivery by any positive evidence whatsoever.
Appellant's attempts, once again, to overcome the
presumption of valid delivery by claiming lack of "intent"
by granter to convey a present interest to the grantee.
However, Appellant's assertions are without merit in four
ways.
First, Appellant cites no Utah cases to support
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-16her assertion that grantor's intent to make a present transfer is even necessary to establish when there is an actual
transfer of the instrument to grantee.

It appears that

all Utah cases where grantor's intent was an issue with
respect to delivery (and hence validity) of a deed involved
fact situations where there was no transfer of custody of
the deed to the grantee.
228 P. 911 (1924)

See Mower v. Mower, 64 Utah 260,

(deed found in grantor's possession at

death); Reed v. Knudson, 80 Utah 428, 15 P.2d 347 (1932)
(evidence of intent important as to whether person to whom
deed was delivered was agent of grantee or of granter);
Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P.2d 465 (1939)
(conflicting testimony as to whether there had been a
manual delivery); Losee v. Jones, 120 Utah 385, 235 P.2d
132 (1951)

(evidence of intent showed irrevocable delivery

of deeds by granter to third party).

In the same vein,

the cases cited by Appellant to support her assertion
are distinguishable on their facts.

In Gilbert v. Mcspadden,

91 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), the deeds were found
in the grantor's baggage (his grip!); at his death, in
Martiney v. Archuleta, 64 N.M. 196, 326 P.2d 1082 (1958),
the questioned deed was never in the possession of the
grantees, and in Henneberry v. Henneberry, 330 P.2d 250
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-17(1958), the court found that the mutual intent of the parties
at the time of manual delivery was that document not take
effect until the grantor's death.
Second, assuming arguendo that under Utah law
grantor's intent is a necessary element of effective
delivery even when there is a transfer of the deed to the
grantee's custody, Appellant still has failed to carry her
burden of providing by clear and convincing evidence that
her intention in executing the deed and delivering it to
grantee was not to convey a present property interest.
This the trial court clearly established, in accordance
with Henneberry, supra, at 253:
Fundamentally, the question of
intent is one of fact to be determined
by the trier of facts on all the evidence.
The trial court was able to consider the testimony of all
witnesses, particularly the Appellant, and observe the
demeanor, behavior, and inconsistencies during that
testimony.
In addition, it is clearly established in July
of 1972, less than one year prior to the execution and
delivery of this deed that Appellant executed a valid will in
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-18which she left, among other things, the residue of her
estate to Respondent.

The will was not revoked or modi-

fied prior to execution and delivery of the deed in
question.

Clearly, the July 1972 will is where any

testamentary gift or future interest would be provided
for--including any residue.

In making a present gift,

as the trial court found, Appellant intended delivery to
convey present title of a present interest.
There is much other evidence which this Court
may choose to review to support this point.

The great

preponderance of the evidence establishes, however, that
Appellant did intend, at the time the deed was executed
and delivered, to convey to Respondent a present interest
in joint ownership of the property as joint tenants.
POINT III
DEED NOT INVALID FOR ALLEGED FRAUD, UNDUE
INFLUENCE, OR MISTAKE.
Appellant correctly asserts that a deed may be
voided for fraud or undue influence of the grantee upon
the granter.

Since undue influence is often used

synonymously with fraud or as a species of constructive
fraud

(~Annot.,

28 A.L.R. 787

(1924); Annot., 92 A.L.R.

790 (1935)), both subjects will be treated here.

Because
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-19of the common issues involved, mistake will also be considered under voidability of a deed.

A.

Failure to Prove Fraud.
Appellant failed to prove* the nine basic elements

of fraud, which are:
It may be stated generally that the
elements of actual fraud consist of:
(1) A representation; (2) its falsity;
(3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's
knowledge of its falsity or ignorance
of its truth; (5) his intent that it
should be acted upon by the person and
in the manner reasonably contemplated;
(6) the hearer's ignorance of its
falsity; (7) his reliance upon its
truth; (8) his right to rely thereon;
(9) his consequent and proximate injury.
Stuck v. Delta Land & Water, 63 Utah 495, 505, 227 P. 791,
795 (1924), CITED IN Kinnear v. Prows, 81 Utah 135, 16 P.
2d 1094

(1932); Oberg v. Sanders, 111 Utah 507, 184 P.2d

229 (1947); Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 873
(1952) .
The general law is in harmony with Utah law with
regard to the burden of proof resting on the one alleging
*Furthermore, Appellant even failed to plead fraud (or
mistake) with particularity, contrary to Rule 9(c) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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-20fraud:
[t)he party who alleges fraud as the basis
of a cause of action or defense has the
burden of establishing it by the requisite
of quantum of proof in order to prevail in
this action.
37 Arn.Jur.2d, Fraud and Deceit
§437, at 596 (1968).
Appellant failed to prove these elements of trial court,
where Respondent (by far) exceeded his burden in not only
establishing the absence of fraud, but did so by introducing
far more evidence than his small burden required to establish
firmly and clearly the absence of fraud in this transaction.
Finally, it should be pointed out here that at
trial, Appellant herself took the rather confusing position
by insisting, under oath, that she signed

nothing in

Attorney Finlinson's office, but that whatever she did
sign was a will!

This denial of signature was contradicted

not only by Attorney Finlinson's seal and signature on the
deed, but also contradicted Attorney Finlinson's testimony
and Respondent's testimony as well.
Another interesting question arises with regard
to Respondent allegedly folding a yellow paper over the
instrument to "trick" the mother he stood by and sacrificed
for.

Appellant claims she could not see the deed because
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-21of the paper.

She also claims she cannot see at all, with-

out her glasses, and at trial took great pains to indicate
this "problem" by taking several minutes to search for
and put on glasses each time asked to read something.
she can·· t

If

see, as counsel suggests, then she really did not

miss anything even if the deed were "obscured."

However,

the trial court observed this little comedy and probably
saw through it in finding for as well as holding for
Respondents.
Separate evidence clearly establishes, moreover,
that the warranty deed in question was signed, witnesses,
and notarized in Fred Finlinson's law office.
was this "folded paper" with reference to?

What, then,

If it did

indeed exist, it obviously did not obscure the deed in
question.
It would appear, in short, that any testimony which
contradicts Appellant's somewhat jaundiced perception of the
facts is to be denied any integrity and credibility whatsoever, if Appellant is to be believed.

The trial court did

not, of course, give credence to these irresponsible allegations and inferences of fraud.
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-22B.

Failure to Prove Undue Influence.
The burden on Appellant to prove undue influence

is more than clear and convincing.
be "cogent."

The evidence must also

See Richmond v. Ballard, 7 Utah 2d 341, 325

P.2d 839 (1958), CITED IN Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 50 Wash.
2d 142, 309 P.2d 1050 (1957).
Once again, Appellant has failed in trial court
to prove that burden.

If anything, at trial the Appellant's

very strong will and inability

to be influenced by anyone

were very evident to the trier of fact.
Appellant appears uncertain, even evasive, in
attempting to define undue influence.

She cites two out-

of-state cases as well as American Jurisprudence in a vague
and muddled way, without reference to the more commonly
understood definitions which amount to substituting the
will of one person for that of another.
One court has held that undue influence
[t]o vitiate a conveyance must destroy
the grantor's free agency at the time the
conveyance is executed and must, in effect,
substitute the will of another for that of
the granter . . . [n]ot all influences will
avoid a deed.
Influences which arise out of
the affection, confidence and gratitude of a
parent to a child and inspire a gift are
natural and lawful influences and will not
render such a gift voidable.
It is only
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-23when influences have been such as to
confuse the judgment and control the
will of the granter that they become
undue influences. Antle v. Hartman,
193 Okla. 524,524, 525-26, 145 P.2d
756, 756-57 (1944).
(Emphasis added).
Appellant maintained her free agency at all times
in her dealings in question.

The attempted appearance of

Appellant as a befuddled old lady who can never quite find
her glasses, and never really understands what's going on,
was easily seen through in court.

Appellant, if influenced

at all, was found to be influenced by Respondents' thankless
tasks in constantly interrupting his own life to look after
his mother.

That a gift of real property, in joint tenancy

deed, was given to Respondent in gratitude is not surprising,
but rather is a natural and lawful consequence of natural
and lawful concern

and

anxiety of a son for his elderly

mother.
One court, in an amazingly similar fact situation
as the case at bar, has broken down the elements of undue
influence with secure specificity:
It has been held that whatever may
be the particular form of undue influence
asserted in all cases, three factors are
involved:
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-24(1)

A person who can be influenced.

(2)
The fact of improper influence
exerted.
(3)
Submission to the overmastering
effect of such unlawful conduct.
Johnson v. Johnson, 85 N.W.2d 211, 221
(N.D. 1957) tdeed of all grantor's farm
lands to himself and one of his sons as
joint tenants held valid).
Early in trial proceedings, Appellant conceded
she is competent.

As the facts, testimony, and Appellant's

demeanor and bearing developed at trial, it became obvious
to all, including the fact finder, that Appellant is
definitely not "a person who can be influenced."
Likewise, the trial court held as a matter of
fact that the "fact of improper influence exerted" simply
was not present.
Similarly, Point 3 of Johnson, supra, was found
to be non-existent, since no unlawful conduct was established, and in any event Appellant did not submit to the
"overmastering effect" of "such unlawful conduct."
Since neither fraud nor undue influence were
established, nor can now be established, there is no
reason to reverse the trial court and cancel a clear and
valid warranty deed.
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-25Appellant cites two lengthy citations from American
Jurisprudence to suggest that undue influence is present due
to a "confidential relationship" between mother and son.
Appellant, however, assumes that a confidential or fiduciary
relationship exists between Appellant and Respondent in the
present case.

While Appellant correctly asserts that a

presumption of undue influence may exist in some cases where a
proven confidential or fiduciary relationship exists between
grantor and grantee as to the subject matter of the transaction in question.

However, the burden of proving the existence

of a confidential or fiduciary relationship remains on the
grantor.

See Klaber v. Unity School of Christianity, 330 Mo. 854,

51 S.W.2d 30 (1932).

The burden is evident:

"Where the

relationship does not exist as a matter of law, must be proved
by clear and convincing evidence."

Stone v. Stone, 407 Ill.

66, 77, 94 N.E.2d 855, 861 (1950).

Appellant asserted and

failed to prove, in the trial court, that such a relationship
existed between the parties in this action with respect to the
property in question--namely, the property deeded to Respondent
by the Appellant.
Appellant attempted to prove that Respondent owed
fiduciary duties to his mother in his capacity as trustee of
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-26her revocable trust.

It is axiomatic that a trustee's

duties to a beneficiary do not extend to dealings in
property not part of the trust res.

See Bogert & Bogert,

Handbook of the Law of Trusts, §96, at 352 (5th ed. 1973);
First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Gold, 217 Wis. 522, 259
N.W. 260 (1935); Stone v. Stone, supra.

In the present

case, the property conveyed in the challenged deed was not
part of the trust at the time the deed was executed.
Appellant had withdrawn the Fillmore properties from the
trust a year and a half previous to the execution of the
deed in question, and the 640 acres of grazing ground near
Cove Fort had never been included in the trust res.
Respondent owed

Thus

Appellant no duties with regard to the

property in question.

Appellant's assertion to the contrary

is as spurious and misplaced on appeal as it was when the
trial court ruled against her.
Furthermore, Appellant argues that the relationship between her and her son is per se confidential merely
because a parent-child relationship exists.

Utah law clearly

rejects the per se rule:
[t]he mere relationship of parent and
child does not constitute evidence of
such confidential relationship as to
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-27create a presumption of fraud or undue
influence.
Bradbury v. Rasmussen, supra,
citing Froyd v. Barnhurst, 83 Utah 271, 28
p. 2d 135 (1934).
~also

Furlong v. Tilley, 51 Utah 617, 172 P. 676 (1918),

Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 948 P. 433 (1914).
Once again the burden of proof is on the Appellant-in this case to prove the existence of a confidential relationship by clear and convincing evidence.

Once, again the

Appellant clearly failed to carry the burden of proof, both
at trial court and in argument on appeal.
For the sake of argument only, however, let us
assume that a confidential or fiduciary relationship
existed with respect to the property in question.

Appellant

must still show that undue influence in fact did exist.
The grantee need not prove by "clear and convincing"
evidence, but only "by a preponderance of the evidence
that the transaction was fair."
supra at 713 n. 4.

Bradbury v. Rasmussen,

This burden Respondent has shown at

trial.
Appellant

~

stipulation is mentally competent,

a fact which distinguishes this case from those in which
deeds have been cancelled because of undue influence.
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-28See Parris v. Benedict, 28 Wash.2d 817, 184 P.2d 63

(1947)

where the court noted that out of eleven previous cancellation of deed cases involving claims of undue influence in
Washington, in every case decreeing cancellation the court
found the granter to be mentally incompetent or nearly so,
Conversely, in every case where the challenged deed was uphelc,
the granter was found clear of mind, or at least not mentally
incompetent.

In cases where gr an tors have less mental capacit

than Appellant, who admittedly is fully competent, courts have
refused to invalidate challenged conveyances.
Richmond v. Ballard, supra,

See,

~.,

(deed from 86-year old man to

housekeeper upheld); Johnson v. Johnson, supra,

(deed upheld

from father to son and himself as joint tenants); Binder v.
Binder, 50 Wash. 20, 142, 309 P.2d 1050 (1967)

(deed from

mother to son upheld}; Thomas v. Johnson, 183 Ore. 405, 193
P.2d 534

(1948)

(deed reserving a life estate from mother to

adopted daughter upheld); O'Neill v. Dennis, 109 Cal. App.
2d 210, 240 P.2d 376 (1952)

(deed upheld from 80-year old

woman to casual friend) •
All this the trial court carefully considered and
held for Respondent.

With the even heavier burden on appeal

to overcome, Appellant should not, as a matter of law, be
permitted to prevent a valid gift of a warranty deed to be
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-29invalidated.

Appellant's emotional rhetoric, slander

of all attorneys involved (except her own) for obvious
reasons, and misplaced innvendo to the contrary.
The Supreme Court of Utah should not for a moment
be swayed by Appellant's attempts side-step the real issues
by emotional advocacy.

Appellant, as was obvious in trial

court, is hardly the innocent, misguided person who sweetly
and naively placed all trust and all her security in her
dastardly son who, abetted by a battery of shifty, incompetent
legal counsel, tricked her into signing a document with
WARRANTY DEED spelled out clearly at the top, properly
notarized, and duly recorded.
C.

Failure to Prove and Absence of Mistake.
Appellant merely cites an irrelevant section of

American Jurisprudence to argue mistake in this case.

As

with her other alleged defenses, the burden of proof here
rests with Appellant.

Appellant must prove the type of

mistake of law or fact that warrants equitable cancellation of the deed.

See 54 Arn.Jur.2d Mistake, Accident, or

Surprise, §26.
At trial Appellant failed to prove either mutual
or unilateral mistake, or the materiality thereof.

Appellant
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-30here does not even identify whether the "mistake" alleged
was one of law or fact.

Appellant cites no Utah or other

primary authority to support her position, whatever that
position may be.

The trial court did not cancel the

transaction in question, on grounds of mistake or for any
other reason.

It is not clear why or how "mistake" was an

issue at trial, and it is even less clear why cancellation
on grounds of mistake is truly at issue now, on appeal.
POINT IV
BALANCING OF EQUITIES
A.

Laches.
Appellant, seeking an equitable remedy, is required

to prosecute her claim in a reasonable time.
failed to do.

This Appellant

Delay of two or three years in bringing the

action, as is the case here, has been held sufficient for
the doctrine of laches to apply.

See Leeper v. Beltrami,

53 Cal.2d 195, 347 P.2d 12, l Cal. Rptr. 12 (1959).

And

the general rule requires promptness.
A suit for recission (cancellationl must be
brought promptly after the plaintiff has knowledge of the
facts constituting the grounds for recission.
three years is not prompt.

Certainly

The Utah statute of limitations
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-31is three years with respect to actions for fraud or mistake.
Utah Code Ann., §78-12-36.

Three years and one day have

elapsed between the alleged fraud and the filing of the
complaint.

One day is sufficient to bar the claim by law.

Appellant's unreasonable and unexplained delay is certainly
a factor to be considered in balancing the equities.
B.

Burden of Proof.
The burden is on the Appellant for what is essen-

tially a bill in equity.

She has failed to show that this
~fortiori

court's equitable jurisdiction is correctly invoked,

with sufficient weight to tilt the balance of equities in her
favor to merit cancellation.

Even without Appellant's burden

of proof, the balance of equities favors Respondents,
especially so on appeal.
C.

Appellant's Emotional Appeals.
Appellant•s emotional appeals fool no one, and are

obviously irrelevant under the facts of this case.

This is

especially so with respect to the security of the elderly.
Even if Appellant did not possess other private resources,
she would be secure because Respondents have no intention of
evicting Appellant or even of challenging Appellant's
possession of or income from the property in question.
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-32Respondents have no counterclaim praying for partition
of the property and ejectment of the Appellant.
CONCLUSION
It is well established that Appellant executed
a deed and not a will.
delivered.
trial.

The deed was validly executed and

Appellant's intent was clear, and was proved at

She was subject to no fraud, undue influence, or

mistake.

The property in question was not in the trust

res she had established.

There was no trustee-in-trust

or implicit fiduciary duty of Respondent to Appellant
under the facts given.

Appellant delayed filing this

action for an unreasonable time.

The trial court did not

abuse its discretion, and carefully weighed the facts and
law.

The decision for Respondents was on the merits,

and was a proper decision.

The trial court should be

sustained on all points.
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